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Introduction 
Globalisation and intensified transnational competition have led to the introduction of 
a variety of new work practices and forms of employee relations. Especially in large 
companies, including multinational companies (MNCs), attention to improved organ-
isational performance is no longer limited to the most effective labour cost manage-
ment, but involves a variety of soft work practices. These aim at motivating employees, 
fostering creativity and teamwork, rewarding personal initiative, providing social wel-
fare and thus stimulating employee commitment to company interests (Dessler 1999; 
Dobbin 2005; Bolton/Houlihan 2007; Jacoby 2005; Nolan/O'Donnell 2003; Truss et 
al. 1997). The specific characteristic of soft work practices is that they are excluded 
from a formalised employment contract and are often beyond the scope of legal regu-
lation or collective bargaining. Instead, they are formed and continuously recreated in 
management-worker interaction at the workplace. Recognizing soft practices rests on 
the premise that managing organizations like communities instead of distant, market-
like relationship vis-à-vis employees yields comparative advantages to companies in 
their business performance (Pfeffer 2006; Pfeffer/Veiga 1999; Peterson 1993). Soft 
work practices thus do not directly derive from labour costs, but from company val-
ues and social relations between managers and workers at the workplace. 
How can we understand similarities and differences between soft work practices 
in MNC subsidiaries in differing local conditions? Other than reflecting the company’s 
economic interest, a successful implementation of work practices requires attention to 
workers’ interests, and to specific national cultural and organisational aspects in which 
work practices are applied (Michailova 2002; Maurice/Sorge 2000; Peterson 1993). 
This is particularly relevant for MNCs, because they simultaneously operate in differ-
ent host-country conditions. In an attempt to understand how MNCs’ soft work prac-
tices respond to corporate economic interests and host-country conditions in Western 
Europe and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), this paper has two aims. First, it docu-
ments and compares selected soft work practices (work systems and fringe benefits) in 
two Western and two CEE subsidiaries of a Dutch MNC. Acknowledging institutional 
variation in labour laws, industrial relations and working standards across Western 
Europe and CEE, the paper’s second aim is to understand which factors shape the 
observed similarities and differences in soft work practices. With this focus, the paper 
responds to the recent literature’s call for comparative analyses of work practices re-
sulting from politics within MNCs, i.e. the micro-level relationship between manage-
ment and employees in a cross-national perspective (Ferner/Quintanilla/Sánchez-
Runde 2006; Geppert/Mayer 2006; Tempel/Wächter/Walgenbach 2006; Scharpf 
1997).  
In understanding whether work practices across subsidiaries differ or converge, 
available literature has considered the MNC’s instrumental economic interest and the 
role of host-country institutions as explanatory factors. Next to these factors, I con-
sider the role of MNC’s corporate values, or its administrative heritage of doing things 
in the organization, for understanding soft work practices (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). I 
argue that interaction between the profit interest, moral values and host-country institu-
tions is central in understanding the construction of work practices and their cross-
subsidiary similarities and differences. The means of achieving profits are endogenous 
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and informed by company values, responsiveness to workers’ interests in different 
countries and the MNC’s ability to benefit from host-country resources. Values shape 
the MNC’s perception of what is rational and how to achieve profits in differing sub-
sidiary conditions. Thus, the MNC’s rational behaviour in producing similarities and 
differences in work practices is contextualized in local socio-institutional conditions, 
as well as it is informed by company values. Such interaction yields subsidiary work 
practices that are neither fully standardized across the subsidiaries, nor extensively 
adapted to local work standards. Instead, the MNC’s soft work practices are embed-
ded in, but only selectively adapted to, host-country standards. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section conceptualizes the explored 
work practices as well as the MNC’s economic interests, values and host-country insti-
tutions. In the third section I provide empirical evidence on work systems and fringe 
benefits across four MNC subsidiaries in Belgium, France, Hungary and Poland. The 
fourth section compares work practices across these subsidiaries and relates them to 
relevant local standards in each case. The fifth section explains how the MNC’s profit 
interest, values and local institutions interact in understanding cross-subsidiary simi-
larities and differences and the utilization of host-country conditions. The concluding 
section summarises the overall argument.  
Conceptualising work systems and fringe benefits   
Soft practices derive from company values, social relations between managers and 
workers at the workplace, and from implicit aspects of the employment contract (c.f. 
Marsden 1999). However, empirical studies on employment relations in MNCs pre-
dominantly focus on work practices directly related to labour costs, which are part of 
a formal employment contract, i.e, working time, employment flexibility, and wages 
(Almond/Ferner 2006; Marginson/Meardi 2006; Meardi/Tóth 2006; Bluhm 2001; 
Ortiz 1999; Gallie et al. 1998). Such orientation leaves less formalised work practices 
(i.e. workplace communication, commitment to worker welfare, worker discretion) 
without a sufficient comparative exploration.   
Motivated by this shortcoming, the current paper describes two sets of soft work 
practices: work systems and fringe benefits of production workers in four subsidiaries 
of a Dutch industrial MNC across Western Europe and CEE. The aim is to shed light 
on similarities and differences between the subsidiaries and between subsidiaries and 
local standards; and to understand how several explanatory factors, i.e. the MNCs’ 
profit interest, corporate values, and the local institutional framework, interact in 
shaping these practices.  
The East-West comparison is justified because of distinct economic and institu-
tional conditions, including employment regulation, trade union roles, working stan-
dards and motivation practices (Kohl/Platzer 2004; Danis 2003; Michailova 2003; 
Meardi 2002; Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Whitley et al. 1997). In the West, employment 
relations and work practices are to a great extent entrenched in long-term commit-
ments, consensual work organisation, and institutionalised bargaining (Bluhm 2001; 
Ferner/Quintanilla 1998). In contrast, with more extensive workplace competition 
and the use of performance-related pay, CEE presents a less coordinated institutional 
context for work practices than Western Europe without a strong collective represen-
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tation of workers’ interests (Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Whitley, et al. 1997). The empirics 
reveal how the studied MNC has taken advantage of these differences.  
The conceptualization of work systems draws on the social structuring of man-
agement-workforce interaction at the workplace, embracing distinctive patterns of 
interconnected characteristics of task organisation and control, workplace relations 
between social groups, and employment practices and policies (Whitley 1999: 90). 
Work system attributes adopted from Whitley (1999) directly address micro-level so-
cial interaction at the workplace and therefore offer a feasible operationalization for a 
subsidiary-level case study (see table 1).  
Table 1: Work systems 
Attributes 
Work system type 
Taylorist Delegated responsibility Flexible specialization 
 Paternalist Negotiated Artisanal Patriarchal 
Task fragmenta-
tion High Low Low Low Low 
Worker discretion 
and involvement Low Considerable High High Limited 
Managerial 
control over work 
organization 
High Considerable Some Some High 
Separation of 
managers from 
workers 
High Variable Low Low High 
Employer com-
mitment to core 
workforce 
Low High Considerable Limited Limited 
Rewards tied to: Standardized jobs 
Personal per-
formance and 
abilities 
Skills 
Skills and 
personal 
evaluation 
Personal evalua-
tion of perform-
ance 
Source: Whitley (1999: 92). 
 
The assessment whether the subsidiary scores high or low on particular attributes, 
listed in the paper’s empirical section, derives from a comparative evaluation of sub-
sidiary practices relative to the other subsidiaries as well as the local standards in each 
host country. Next to participant observation in the CEE subsidiaries, I interviewed 
subsidiary and headquarter managers, subsidiary and higher-level trade unions, repre-
sentatives of the local society and local labour market boards in all host countries. For 
the sake of comparability, the same interview templates were used across all countries 
and subsidiaries.  
The second set of studied soft work practices includes social welfare provisions, 
or fringe benefits, for subsidiary production workers. Generous fringe benefits tend to 
be offered in paternalistic companies that fulfil their economic interests via raising a 
committed workforce (Pfeffer 2006; Stoop 1992). In contrast, a company aiming at 
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short-term profit maximisation through exploiting workers’ skills is reluctant to offer 
generous benefits (Deery/Iverson 2005; Hyman/Mason 1995). They can therefore be 
in the long run beneficial for the MNC’s profit interest (Deery/Iverson 2005; Heller et 
al. 1998). In Western Europe, coordinated employment relations secure an extensive 
institutionalisation of benefits and thus create external pressures on MNCs to provide 
them (Meardi 2006; Mailand/Due 2004; Dickmann 2003). In economies with a lower 
degree of institutionalised employment regulation, including CEE countries, MNCs 
are driven to provide benefits on a competitive basis. Thus, in such countries fringe 
benefits depend greatly on market pressures or on MNCs’ voluntary decision to pro-
vide benefits. In the analysis of fringe benefits, I draw on the same data sources and 
follow the same methodological principles as in the analysis of work system attributes.  
In an attempt to understand why subsidiary work systems and fringe benefits are 
similar or differ, I consider the interplay of three relevant explanatory factors. The 
first one is the MNC’s instrumental economic interest, operationalized as a strive for 
immediate profits through international competitiveness and efficiency 
(Paauwe/Boselie 2005; Martin/Beaumont 1998). Second, I acknowledge the coercive 
effect of host-country institutions on MNC behaviour and work practices (Mau-
rice/Sorge 2000; Ferner/Quintanilla 1998; Luthans et al. 1997; Maurice et al. 1981). 
Third, attention is paid to company values and beliefs about a socially accepted way of 
running a company (Scharpf 1997). These values are the hallmark of the MNCs’ ad-
ministrative heritage and may alter managerial behaviour towards workers regardless 
of economic interests and institutional constraints (Pfeffer 2006; Bartlett/Ghoshal 
2002).   
First, in an economic perspective, companies are instrumentally rational actors 
exclusively motivated by their profit interest, making calculations of costs and benefits 
of alternative actions (Bandelj 2008; Rubery/Grimshaw 2003; Phelan/Lewin 2000; 
Turner 1991; Womack et al. 1991; Grandori 1987). A consideration of costs, including 
those of soft work practices, should thus be central in the decision about subsidiary 
practices. Applied to MNCs, we can operationalize the MNCs’ economic interest as 
profit interest (Kahancová 2010; Grandori 1987). To achieve profits, MNCs are ex-
pected to strive for international efficiency through the diffusion of universal work 
practices exogenous to the local subsidiary context (Rubery/Grimshaw 2003: 28). 
Striving for international efficiency is the main factor accountable for the requirement 
to lower costs, including labour costs and worker benefits (Cappelli 1999). The empir-
ical measurement of MNC’s economic interest relates to this cost consideration, 
namely, whether the decision to adopt a particular soft practice in the subsidiary is 
directly related to cost measures. Next to these direct cost considerations, I also con-
sider counterfactual evidence on soft practices; to be observed if the MNC would 
strictly follow cost considerations in particular practices. Furthermore, I refrain from 
distinguishing between short-term and long-term profit interests and maintain that a 
direct relation to costs is a better indicator. In the long-run, each MNC is expected to 
act pragmatically and follow a rational behavioural logic influenced by the particular 
context in which work practices are constructed (Kahancová 2010).  
Deriving from the profit interest conceptualization, I expect the MNC’s econom-
ic interest to be a strong explanatory factor of soft work practices only if particular 
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work practices directly relate to labour costs regardless of local institutional pressures. 
In particular, generous benefits should be provided only if directly improving MNC 
profitability (c.f. Deery/Iverson 2005; Sagie/Koslowsky 2000). Following this instru-
mental economic logic, one should observe cross-subsidiary convergence in work 
practices resulting from the MNC’s strive for efficiency and profits through best prac-
tice. Eventual cross-subsidiary differences in work practices can then derive from the 
resistance of host-country institutions to MNC conduct (Harzing/Sorge 2003; Ru-
bery/Grimshaw 2003; Ortiz 1999).  
Host-country institutional pressures, or local isomorphism, are countervailing 
forces to the MNC’s profit interest shaping subsidiary work practices. Local factors 
can constrain MNCs in opting for a cross-subsidiary diffusion of best practices and 
pull them in the other direction; namely, encouraging MNCs to adopt work practices 
similar to other employers in the local environment (Ferner/Quintanilla 1998). In 
other words, local institutions coerce MNCs to adapt to local work standards (Soskice 
2000; Streeck 1992; Dore 1991; Maurice et al. 1981). Acknowledging the institutional 
differences, i.e. coordinated regulation of work practices, role of trade unions and 
strong legal enforcement mechanisms across Western Europe and CEE, MNCs 
should maintain their commitment to decent working conditions and generous bene-
fits in Western Europe because of institutional pressures. In CEE, MNCs are ex-
pected to foster a market-like relationship with workers, with less commitment to 
decent working conditions and fewer non-wage benefits. This means buying labour 
for money without long-term commitment and keeping the local workforce out of the 
MNC’s organizational boundaries (Pfeffer 2006).  
Operationalizing and measuring the impact of host-country institutions on work 
practices is a challenging task. In this qualitative comparative case study, I evaluate the 
coercive strength of host-country institutions to force MNCs to adapt to local work 
standards by comparing the MNC’s subsidiary practices and local standards in each 
host country. This comparison yields relevant findings only if coupled with a counter-
factual comparison of documented subsidiary’s practices with hypothetical practices 
following the MNC’s profit interest and thus labour costs, and an effort in diffusing 
best practices across the subsidiaries.  
The final factor considered in explaining similarities and differences in work prac-
tices are company values, referring to a common understanding about how certain 
processes are best dealt with in the MNC and at what level of the organization (Bar-
tlett/Ghoshal 2002: 37-8). They shape organizational capabilities, business processes, 
subsidiary roles, and interaction with employees, suppliers, and other actors. Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (2002) refer to such set of values as to administrative heritage resembling 
company traditions in particular configuration of assets and capabilities, distribution 
of managerial responsibilities, and an ongoing set of relationships that endure long 
after structural changes. Values can account for the decision whether to build com-
mitment to workers in a long-term perspective or whether to aim at exploitative and 
market-like employment relations. Operationalization of MNC values in this paper 
draws extensively on a broader study of the MNC’s history and the social construction 
of subsidiary work practices, as well as on secondary literature focusing on the same 
MNC (Kahancová 2010; Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002; Stoop 1992). In this paper, I present 
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values that have continuously shaped the construction of subsidiary work practices; 
and analyze how they alter the MNC’s universal profit interest when responding to 
host-country institutions and constructing particular work practices in particular sub-
sidiaries.  
In the following sections I elaborate how the MNC’s profit interest, host-country 
institutions and company values interact with each other in the construction of soft 
work practices; and how this interaction accounts for observed similarities and differ-
ences across the subsidiaries.  
The paper’s empirical evidence draws on a broader book project on work prac-
tices in a leading Dutch MNC in the electronics sector (see Kahancová 2010). For 
reasons of confidentiality, the company is referred to by an acronym Multico. Multico 
was established in the late 19th century and experienced a gradual expansion abroad. 
Despite recent corporate reorganisations aimed at centralizing core assets and strategic 
decisions, the corporate strive for profitability continues to coexist with decentralised 
labour management. Multico maintains its long-established reputation of responsive-
ness to local conditions, especially through decentralised employment relations. I fo-
cus on work systems and fringe benefits of production workers in Multico subsidiaries 
located in Belgium (hereafter MBE), France (hereafter MFR), Hungary (hereafter 
MHU) and Poland (hereafter MPL). These subsidiaries belong to key employers in 
respective local conditions and are comparable in their industrial activity, products 
produced, position within the MNC’s structure, and headquarter relations. Despite 
some expatriate managers to control the production process and align it with corpo-
rate strategies, all HRM managers were locals. The analysis is based on internal com-
pany reports, local newspaper clippings and 114 detailed face-to-face interviews con-
ducted in 2004 and 2005. An in-depth elaboration of the company structure, its his-
tory and the characteristics of the studied subsidiaries is included in Kahancová 
(2010). Methods of data collection and data analysis are elaborated in Kahancová 
(2007, chapter 3).  
Work systems and fringe benefits across MNC subsidiaries 
Selecting subsidiaries within the same MNC for empirical scrutiny yields a unique 
comparative framework of most similar subsidiaries in different host countries. Sub-
sidiaries are similar in their labour force size, products, and position within Multico’s 
corporate structure (Kahancová 2010: 46-52). Their production, coordinated by an 
assigned business unit within Multico’s corporate headquarters, embraces assembly of 
televisions and home entertainment products. Subsidiaries also share a wage strategy 
(paying slightly above local sectoral average) and undergo comparable production 
cycles (high-season vs. low-season production). 
Unlike their similarity in production and structural location within Multico, the 
subsidiaries are located in countries with distinct labour market conditions and indus-
trial relations.1 MBE, established in 1950s, is located in a highly industrialised region 
with many employment opportunities. MFR, established in 1972, benefits from the 
                                                          
1  See Kahancová (2010, Chapters 2 and 5) for a detailed description of each subsidiary’s 
external conditions, workforce, work practices and workplace industrial relations. 
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region’s relatively high unemployment and availability of temporary agency workers. 
MPL operates in conditions of high unemployment despite the presence of several 
large employers and thus job opportunities. In contrast, MHU faces a tight labour 
market with low unemployment, which forces Multico to develop innovative ways to 
secure workers’ commitment (Kahancová 2007).  
Multico’s subsidiaries share several work system attributes: low separation be-
tween managers and workers, training encouragement, and commitment to a highly 
performing workforce based on collective and individual performance evaluations. 
Still, they differ in other attributes: competition between workers (CEE compared to 
Western subsidiaries), task fragmentation (MHU compared to the others), managerial 
control over work organization (MPL compared to the others), and the basis for re-
ward allocation (CEE compared to Western subsidiaries). A detailed comparative 
overview of Multico subsidiaries’ work organization that constitutes a subsidiary-
specific work system is listed in Table A.1 in the Annex. Next, a comparison of per-
formance rewards and the basis for their allocation is included in Table A.2 in the 
Annex. The provided empirical evidence helps evaluating particular work systems’ 
characteristics in each subsidiary vis-à-vis other subsidiaries and formulating an argu-
ment regarding cross-subsidiary similarities and differences. Assessing this evidence, 
work systems characteristics in Multico subsidiaries can be summarized as follows (see 
table 2 below).   
Table 2:  Work systems in Multico’s subsidiaries 
Characteristics MBE MFR MPL MHU 
Task fragmentation low low low  high 
Worker discretion high high high low 
Direct managerial control 
over work organisation considerable considerable low high 
Separation/segmentation 
between managers and 
workers 
low low low low 
Employer commitment to core 
workforce 
high; somewhat 
performance 
based 
high; perform-
ance based 
high; performance 
based 
high; performance 
based 
Basis for reward allocation 
job, skills, quality 
and collective 
performance 
job, skills, quality 
and collective 
performance 
short/long-term 
individual and 
collective perform-
ance and abilities  
short/long-term 
individual and 
collective per-
formance and 
abilities 
Source: author’s analysis following Whitley (1999). 
 
Each subsidiary pays attention to developing workers’ competences and identifying 
individual abilities. Managers maintain that direct interaction with workers is crucial 
for subsidiary performance and productivity, and that the subsidiaries should invest in 
raising a committed workforce. Daily interaction between managers and workers, 
coupled with a low separation between management and workers, are essential for 
Multico’s intention to build cooperative work relations. This managerial attitude is 
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consistent across various work system attributes, including communication style, mo-
tivation, and informal workplace interaction. Multico’s managers do not aim at 
straightforward domination and exploitation of the workforce, but at an alignment of 
workers’ values with company values through increasing the workers’ beliefs that they 
are important for Multico. A quote from MPL’s manager illustrates this point: 
“ […] ‘Nobody works for Multico; you only work for your boss.’ That’s true. If you look 
up to your boss and you have a lot of respect for him, he has been very good to you and 
you have been very good to him and the communication works there, if he comes to you 
and says ‘I would like you to work an extra hour today,’ you would be much happier to do 
it than if you have a very bad relationship and you have some kind of dictator walking 
along the production line” (Manufacturing Manager MPL, 21 April 2004). 
The outlined similarities however do not mean that Multico harmonizes soft work 
practices across the studied subsidiaries. Rather, responsiveness to particular local 
conditions is a central attribute of Multico’s administrative heritage. In the past twenty 
years of corporate development, which have included severe reorganisations and job 
losses, Multico has continued to maintain its paternalistic work practices responsive to 
different country conditions as long as they do not clash with corporate economic 
interests, thus balancing the need for profits and efficiency with a purposeful utiliza-
tion of host-country differences. In consequence, subsidiary managements draw on 
host-country standards when constructing their soft practices. This leads to a selective 
adaptation, such as adjusting work practices to host-country culture and perception of 
hierarchies. In MFR the hierarchy between the worker and his/her boss is maintained 
and communication is more formal, whereas in MBE the workers call their managers 
by their first name. A similar situation exists in MHU, in line with common practice in 
Hungary, where managers and workers address each other by first names and maintain 
informal relations despite formal hierarchies. In line with Polish standards, the hierar-
chy in MPL is maintained, but people generally agree right away to call each other by 
their first name and communicate informally. This applies especially to managers and 
workers in daily contact. 
Aside from outlined similarities, the subsidiaries diverge in several work system 
characteristics that are responsive to local conditions and worker mentalities. The 
most important differences apply to workers’ financial motivation. Allocation of re-
wards is linked to performance differently in each subsidiary (see Table A.2 in the 
Annex). Competition between workers is fostered in the CEE sites but not in Western 
sites. Financial motivation is extensively used in CEE, but not in Western subsidiaries. 
In this respect, a clear East-West division in Multico’s practices is observed. In the 
West, soft motivating factors, such as delegated responsibility, open communication, 
non-financial performance appraisals, increasing workers’ interest in company devel-
opments, or the possibility of reverse appraisals (workers’ feedback to immediate su-
pervisors) tend to be more successful. The influence of trade unions also constrains 
the use of performance pay in Western Europe. In CEE subsidiaries, soft motivating 
factors including non-financial performance appraisals exist but are effectively com-
bined with financial motivation. 
Finally, evidence demonstrates individual subsidiary differences, distinct from an 
East-West pattern: i.e., between MHU and the others in task fragmentation, and be-
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tween MPL and the others in managerial control over work organisation and trade 
union involvement in management-workforce interaction. First, the only subsidiary 
where managerial control over work tasks is low is MPL. Host-country institutional 
influences do not account for this fact, because in MPL, and in Poland in general, 
unions are structurally the weakest of all the countries studied. The reason for work-
ers’ extensive freedom over their tasks in MPL is that managers perceive the skilled 
workforce to be able to shoulder individual responsibility. A larger workforce in 
MHU, compared to other subsidiaries, complicates delegated responsibility as exten-
sive as in MPL. Second, managerial control over work organisation tends to be lower 
in countries with strong trade unions, as in Belgium and France. However, in the case 
of Multico the unions have not been strong enough to decrease managerial control, 
which leads to a conclusion that Multico’s work systems in Western subsidiaries differ 
from local standards in managerial control in these countries.  
What do the above findings suggest about overall subsidiary work systems? Al-
though none can be directly associated with Taylorism, delegated responsibility or 
flexible specialisation, all Multico subsidiaries fit a delegated responsibility work sys-
tem with elements of paternalism. This substantiates earlier evidence that paternalism 
towards workers has been an inherent feature of Multico’s corporate values over dec-
ades (Kahancová 2010; van der Meer 2000; Stoop 1992). In its home country the 
Netherlands, Multico has long been perceived as a social employer offering well-paid 
jobs, employment security, housing, health care, education and socio-cultural services 
for employees (van der Meer 2000; Stoop 1992). However, Multico’s paternalism is 
complementary to the company’s economic interest. This is obvious in the fact that 
paternalist practices coexist with tight managerial control in some subsidiaries and the 
fact that workers’ discretion over work tasks is granted only when contributing to the 
MNC’s strive for profit.   
Despite observed similarities and differences in work systems, the fact that all 
subsidiaries fit one work system type is relevant for an argument that a specific work 
system derives from an interaction between Multico’s profit interest, corporate values 
(paternalism and local responsiveness) and host-country standards. This argument 
goes beyond an MNC-driven diffusion of best practices or a forced adaptation to local 
standards resulting from the operation of host-country institutions. I elaborate this 
argument in section five. 
Fringe benefits in Multico subsidiaries comprise practices to increase workers’ 
material wellbeing, and practices fostering recognition of personal qualities and dem-
onstrating Multico’s interest in responding to workers’ work-related and in personal-
social interests. For the sake of brevity, I refer to Table A.3 in the Annex for a detailed 
overview of fringe benefits in each subsidiary. Despite differences in particular types 
of benefits across subsidiaries, the interviews conducted with key informants suggest 
that Multico’s overall aim is to improve workers’ social welfare across different coun-
tries. Fringe benefits are neither coordinated across the subsidiaries, nor do they result 
from a direct headquarter dictate. Instead, these practices are exclusively local, utilizing 
local conditions even if not fully adapting to them. This aligns with Multico’s corpo-
rate value of local responsiveness and cooperation with local actors, i.e. unions or 
works councils, in utilizing local conditions. 
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Evidence on fringe benefits is consistent with the findings on work systems, 
namely, that the economic interest and paternalist values govern subsidiary work prac-
tices while utilizing local standards and cross-country differences. The provision of 
benefits involves costs for the MNC without a direct positive effect on immediate 
profits and efficiency. For this reason, I maintain that providing benefits has a broader 
aim than directly facilitating profits. Of course, Multico’s fundamental interest is profit 
maximization, but the means of achieving profits are long-term, endogenous and in-
fluenced by company values (responsiveness to workers’ local interests) and local 
conditions. 
In sum, evidence shows that Multico opted for a delegated responsibility type of 
work system with elements of paternalism and rather generous fringe benefits regard-
less of subsidiary location. This broadly understood similarity is coupled with a num-
ber of cross-subsidiary differences in specific work practices. An evaluation of this 
evidence – based on a comparison across the four subsidiaries and between the sub-
sidiaries and host country standards – follows next. 
Comparing subsidiary work practices 
Multico’s work systems attributes reveal that some diffusion of best practices across 
the subsidiaries is taking place, although a direct headquarter control over subsidiary 
work practices is marginal. These include delegated authority, flat hierarchies, open 
communication, and informal management-worker relations.  It is however not only 
through best practices that Multico assures worker compliance with profit interest and 
company values. The MNC understands that successful practices in one case may not 
have the same effect on profitability in other cases due to different institutional and 
cultural conditions. Therefore, next to best practices, several work system attributes 
build on local conditions. The institutional effect of host countries is relevant, but 
cannot be separated from Multico’s own willingness to utilize local differences. Varia-
tion is found predominantly in reward allocation (collective in Western subsidiaries 
and individual in CEE subsidiaries), the type and extent of fringe benefits, and the use 
of financial motivation.  
Diffusion of best practices in some work system characteristics is not reproduced 
in fringe benefits; subsidiary benefits are fully responsive to local standards. Interest-
ingly, we cannot speak about the MNC’s adaptation to host-country standards; because 
especially in CEE the subsidiaries’ benefits, and work practices in general, tend to 
exceed local standards. This finding goes against expectations derived from market-
driven conditions in CEE and to a short-term profit drive and exploitative MNC prac-
tices in lower wage countries. Moreover, MHU and MPL benefits relatively surpass 
those in MBE and MFR. Why is this the case? First, maturity of Western subsidiaries, 
stable institutional conditions and strong trade unions account for wage stability, pre-
dictable working conditions and, to a certain extent, job security. In result, the effect 
of additional benefits on worker motivation is more limited than in CEE countries. 
Second, Western subsidiaries face higher labour costs and therefore increased budget 
constraints. Third, because fringe benefits are not corporately determined, their extent 
depends on the values of local managements as well as on local institutional effects, 
including welfare states and trade union strength. The business success of MBE is 
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attributed to the strong task orientation of its general manager at the expense of a 
modest human orientation. In MHU and MPL, managers are more people-oriented 
than task-oriented, and their personal values are reflected in the extent and type of 
fringe benefits provided. Finally, working conditions in CEE subsidiaries are more 
demanding when compared to Western subsidiaries (i.e. longer working hours, a 
higher number of shifts, lower wages) and Multico aims at compensating tough work-
ing conditions with generous benefits. In sum, variation in fringe benefits cannot be 
attributed to Multico’s profit, company values, or local institutional effects individu-
ally. Rather, it is the interplay of profits, values and institutions that allows us to un-
derstand why Multico adopted particular practices in particular countries.   
When contrasting the observed work practices with common patterns in each 
host country, similarities and differences are found yet again. Multico’s work system in 
MBE diverges from other evidence on Belgian standards through its high managerial 
control in work organisation and at the same time extensive communication and feed-
back, low separation between managers and workers, flat hierarchy, and lack of head-
quarter interference in work practices. However, MBE fits the Belgian standard of 
lacking any financial rewards,  most importantly, performance-related pay (Hees 1995 
and interview respondents).  
In contrast to French standards described in the literature, MFR is far from strict 
workplace hierarchies and formal relations (Brunstein 1995; Goyer and Hancké 2006: 
178; Maurice et al. 1981: 84). Despite high managerial control in work organisation, 
French Multico managers claim MFR to have better internal relations than locally 
comparable companies, where employees report considerable pressure and authoritar-
ian management styles. Multico is close to general French practices in fostering team-
work, training, and modest competition via performance-related benefits (EPOC 
1995). Evidence on MFR’s fringe benefits does not support Brunstein’s (1995) find-
ings that practices of some MNCs in France lack social sensitivity towards workers 
and only aim at profits.  
MHU’s work system aligns with Hungarian standards because of high managerial 
control and less mobility between positions, which is related to the large size of the 
workforce. In other practices Multico differs from Hungarian standards in relatively 
generous benefits, direct employee participation, and institutionalisation of perform-
ance evaluations (Whitley et al. 1997). According to the interview respondents, work-
ers appreciate performance pay, fringe benefits, communication possibilities and in-
formal interaction with managers in MHU irrespective of the tight local labour market 
situation with sufficient job opportunities.  
MPL shows a more positive picture of work practices in Poland than docu-
mented in other studies (Kohl/Platzer 2004; Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Maczynski et al. 
1994). Personal values of MPL managers lead to extensive fringe benefits, teambuild-
ing beyond workplace via social events, and relatively good working conditions despite 
tough working time and job insecurity due to a high number of seasonal jobs. This 
enhances the MNC’s reputation as an attractive place to work, and deepens the gap 
between Multico’s work practices and local standards.   
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In sum, work systems and fringe benefits in Multico subsidiaries suggest neither a 
full-fledged corporate diffusion of best practices with the direct instrumental purpose 
of profit seeking, nor an extensive coerced adaptation to local standards due to institu-
tional pressures. Instead, work practices constitute a mixture of best practices and 
locally responsive practices, drawing simultaneously on Multico’s corporate interest, 
paternalism and local responsiveness, and a purposeful exploitation of local differ-
ences. Going beyond this conclusion, in the next section I elaborate the interaction 
between profits, values and institutions in accounting for the observed similarities and 
differences.  
The role of profits, company values and local conditions for MNC work 
practices  
In an attempt to explain similarities and differences in MNC work practices across 
different host countries, the existing literature draws mainly on economic/organiza-
tional and institutional influences.  
An economic/organizational perspective on work practices suggests that MNCs 
build commitment to workers and offer generous benefits only if this leads to in-
creased profits (Deery/Iverson 2005; Sagie/Koslowsky 2000). Evidence in this paper 
does not reject this claim, but suggests looking closer at the means of achieving profit. 
Profit-related measures in subsidiary work practices are central for optimising the 
MNC’s efficiency. At the same time they increase costs in terms of managing the ade-
quate work practices. And, even more importantly, by instrumentally following exclu-
sively an immediate profit goal (in a short-term perspective), Multico would not be 
motivated to provide generous benefits in CEE, reward workers for personal 
achievements, and emphasise informal workplace interaction. Obviously, the purpose 
of these practices is raising a committed workforce securing long-term profitability. 
But when these practices are being constructed, management is faced with high uncer-
tainty regarding the long-term effects on profits. Neither does the company conduct 
direct evaluations and carry out benchmarking against competitors on whether such 
behaviour actually improves profitability. The origin of this no-benchmarking relates to 
Multico’s commitment to decentralized HRM and paternalism towards workers.  
This argument does not render profit considerations unimportant in the MNC’s 
employee relations. Rather, it suggests that the profit interest closely interacts with 
other factors, including company values in general and a purposeful local responsive-
ness in particular. In the past three decades, Multico underwent several major reor-
ganisations. Responding to increased global competition, restructurings brought a 
greater transparency in the organisation’s functioning, but also severe consequences 
for employment. The number of jobs for production workers considerably decreased, 
especially in Western Europe. In some cases, temporary or agency workers replaced 
permanent workers. Thus, in issues of strategic importance, profit is the MNC’s prior-
ity. The means of fulfilling the profit interest are however endogenous and leave a 
significant scope for influence of company values and local institutions.  
In an institutionalist perspective, local institutional factors exert constraints on 
subsidiary work practices in coercing them to local standards (Ferner/Quintanilla 
1998). However, they also create institutional spaces and opportunities in which the 
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MNC embeds itself in order to purposefully construct locally responsive work prac-
tices to meet its profit interest (c.f. Maurice/Sorge 2000; Sellier 2000; Streeck 1997). 
Multico recognises the impact of host-country conditions, both national and local, and 
reflects them in decentralised employee relations. Already in the early 1970s, the com-
pany was well known for its responsiveness to differing local conditions, as illustrated 
by one of the managers: 
“In [Multico’s] experience, national management initiative is the best way of ensuring the 
flexibility and adaptability necessary in widely varying circumstances. This particularly 
holds true for personnel and industrial relations policies, which have to follow national 
legislation […] and to fit into the national labour market situation and industrial relations 
structure and climate as well as take into account national characteristics and preferences” 
(Dronkers 1975; 166).  
If one only considers the coercive effect of local institutions, the outcome would be a 
forced adaptation of MNC practices to local standards. However, as shown above, 
such a wide-ranging forced adaptation of subsidiary work practices to local standards 
does not apply to Multico. Especially the findings in CEE subsidiaries are puzzling, 
because Multico’s way of treating workers and the generosity of fringe benefits exceed 
local standards. The CEE environment is relatively conducive to the exploitative 
treatment of workers by MNCs. A strong institutional framework, i.e. legal stipula-
tions and a system of collective bargaining to facilitate workers’ welfare, is absent 
(Meardi 2006; Avdagic 2005; Mailand/Due 2004). Therefore, Multico is not under 
institutional pressures to offer generous benefits and above-average working condi-
tions. Societal pressures, i.e. benchmarking work practices against other locally estab-
lished companies, and local fashions in management practices that would force Mul-
tico to adapt to local standards in CEE, are not extensive either (Pfeffer 2006; Abra-
hamson 1996). Had Multico been pushed to adapt to local standards because of insti-
tutional pressures in Hungary and Poland, flat hierarchies and attention to worker 
welfare would have been less evident than documented. Regardless of external condi-
tions in CEE, Multico maintained its commitment to offer better work practices than 
other local employers and even some MNCs. Therefore, I argue that instead of a 
forced adaptation, the effect of local institutions is visible through its interaction with 
Multico’s profit interest and corporate values. In result, Multico purposefully utilizes 
local conditions and selectively adapts work practices to local standards.  
Next to the economic/organizational and institutional effects, I argue that a full 
understanding of similarities and differences in soft work practices has to incorporate 
company values, which interact both with the profit interest and with local institu-
tions. Paternalist values have continuously shaped Multico’s actions since the com-
pany’s establishment in the late 19th century and its gradual expansion abroad in the 
early 20th century. Paternalism originated in the company’s early attempt to pacify the 
organised labour movement in the Netherlands (Stoop 1992). Later, Multico’s charis-
matic leaders actively fostered paternalism and local responsiveness after being ex-
posed to the great economic depression in the 1930s and the company’s effort to 
protect jobs during the Second World War (Kahancová 2010). In consequence, a 
company-specific value system was gradually strengthened and permeated managerial 
thinking at all levels of the organisation. The selection and training of local managers 
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is important in maintaining this value system. Instead of imposing corporate values on 
local managers, the company recruits individuals whose personal values match the 
MNC’s values. These managers are then granted large autonomy from headquarters to 
locally construct work practices. In other words, the tight value system of Multico is 
balanced with a loose deployment of corporate values in differing local contexts.  
The above analysis suggests that profits, values and local conditions do play an 
important role in shaping Multico’s work practices. However, the explanatory rele-
vance of profits, values and local conditions becomes clear only after exploring their 
interactions and interdependence. Below I summarize these interactions. 
Multico’s drive towards profit has put company values under pressure. However, 
instead of evading earlier paternalism and local responsiveness, Multico continuously 
seeks to balance its profit interest with established values. Disembedding from the 
MNC’s value system is complicated because the values form the MNC’s path-
dependent administrative heritage (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). Instead of trade-offs be-
tween profit interest and values, Multico attempts to balance these and avoid potential 
clashes. Values shape the company’s perception of what is rational and how to achieve 
profit in differing conditions. As a result, Multico’s reorganisations have brought an 
improvement in profits and efficiency and at the same time signalled a continuity of 
company values in subsidiary work practices. Any company action is ultimately profit-
driven, but in decisions whether or not to achieve profits by soft work practices re-
sponding to local workers’ interests, Multico has opted to do so. Regardless of direct 
profit expectations, managers have maintained their concern about workers’ welfare 
and the belief that people appreciate decent working relations and are more willing to 
expend extra effort when they are psychologically connected to their employer (Pfef-
fer 2006). In other words, company values became the means of achieving long-term 
profit. At the same time, values account for good working conditions even in implicit 
aspects of workers’ employment contract that are not subject to legal regulation or 
collective bargaining. This means that company values stimulate work practices with 
positive effects both for the MNC and for workers.  
Aside from the profit-values interaction, the MNC’s economic interest interacts 
with institutional conditions in host countries. Multico’s local headquarters in the host 
countries have always enjoyed great decision-making powers in governing subsidiaries 
located in the respective country. Corporate reorganisations have not led to a centrali-
sation of such powers at corporate headquarters, but have facilitated further auton-
omy of subsidiaries. This is not the result of Multico’s inability to centralise the con-
struction of subsidiary-specific work practices, but the company’s belief that the sub-
sidiary is the optimal organisational level for managing local resources, in particular 
work practices. Decentralised management aims to better reflect the needs of subsidi-
ary workforce and to decide the subsidiaries’ strategic role within the corporate struc-
ture (c.f. Kristensen/Zeitlin 2005). Multico believes that this kind of HRM constitutes 
the best means to achieve long-term profitability. In other words, Multico has com-
bined the endeavour to achieve profit with utilizing host-country diversities. The fact 
that the company itself is willing to construct different work practices in different 
countries eliminates the tension between a universal profit interest and differing host-
country institutions.    
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Finally, company values interact not only with the MNC’s profit interest, but also 
with local conditions. A tight value system in an MNC can create tensions in the im-
plementation of these values, especially if MNC values clash with host-country work 
standards. To avoid such tension, Multico’s value of local responsiveness is operation-
alized through selecting local managers who run the subsidiaries’ work affairs 
autonomously but in line with corporate values. This way, Multico is able to combine 
corporate paternalism with purposeful local responsiveness and utilize the enabling 
effect of host-country institutions in constructing subsidiary work practices.  Conse-
quently, corporate paternalism is maintained but acquires different meanings across 
different host countries, and leads to selective diffusion and adaptation of subsidiary 
work practices to local conditions. 
Conclusions 
This paper provided empirical evidence on soft work practices (work systems and 
fringe benefits) across Western and CEE subsidiaries of a Dutch MNC. Acknowledg-
ing institutional variation in labour laws, industrial relations and working standards 
across the host countries, the paper’s aim is to understand how the MNC’s profit 
interest, company values, and institutional characteristics in the host countries interact 
in shaping similarities and differences in soft work practices across the studied sub-
sidiaries and host countries.   
Despite being located in different countries, all subsidiaries fit a delegated respon-
sibility work system with elements of paternalism, combining managerial control in 
work organisation with an open relationship towards workers and generous fringe 
benefits exceeding local standards (particularly in CEE). Cross-subsidiary differences 
in work practices apply mainly to financial employee motivation, which tends to fol-
low local standards.  
Implementation of soft work practices is not coordinated across the MNC but re-
sponsive to local conditions. In those aspects of work practices where MNC interest is 
independent from local conditions, or local conditions are similar and therefore enable 
the adoption of best practices, the MNC has opted for similar work practices across 
the subsidiaries. However, in work practices where local conditions are expected to 
play an important role for the company’s profit, the MNC has actively utilized local 
differences to construct subsidiary-specific practices. Thus, documented work systems 
and fringe benefits resemble a mixture of corporate best practices and MNC respon-
siveness (not necessarily forced adaptation) to work standards across Western and 
CEE host countries.  
The main argument that this paper tried to put forward is that interaction between 
the profit interest, moral values and host-country institutions is central in understand-
ing the construction of work practices and their cross-subsidiary similarities and dif-
ferences. The means of achieving profits are endogenous and informed by company 
values, responsiveness to workers’ interests in different countries and the MNC’s abil-
ity to benefit from differing host-country conditions. Values shape the MNC’s percep-
tion on rational behaviour and on the feasible profit-making strategy in particular 
subsidiary environments. Thus, the MNC’s rational behaviour, producing similarities 
and differences in work practices, is contextualized in local institutional conditions, as 
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well as it is informed by company values. Different local conditions are used as a re-
source for securing profits through efficient production, and for developing concrete 
meanings of MNC values in particular subsidiary conditions. Such interaction yields 
subsidiary work practices that are neither fully standardized across the subsidiaries, 
nor extensively adapted to local work standards. Instead, soft work practices are em-
bedded in, but only selectively adapted to, host-country standards. 
The main shortcoming of this paper is its case study based evidence. More re-
search needs to be conducted across several MNCs and their Western European and 
CEE subsidiaries in order to generalize the paper’s findings. Such broader research 
would allow questioning how the interactive process between organizational and insti-
tutional factors in accounting for work practices is informed by another variable, 
namely, the institutional effects of the MNCs’ home countries (Ferner/Quintanilla 
1998). 
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Annex 
Table A.1: Work organization in Multico subsidiaries 
 MBE MFR MPL MHU 
Workforce 
composition 
Two thirds of production 
workers are women, 
because being more 
adept at plugging and 
screwing; 
Permanent and tempo-
rary (agency) workers 
form separate production 
teams 
High share of women 
in general, and even 
higher among produc-
tion workers; 
Temporary workers 
either integrated with 
permanent workers or 
teams of temporary 
workers only2  
Women constitute 
half of the production 
workforce; 
Temporary workers 
integrated with 
permanent workers in 
production teams 
70 to 80 percent of 
production workers 
are women;3 Perma-
nent, temporary and 
agency workers form 
joint production teams. 
Production 
lines structure 
Two assembly lines in 
two shifts over five days 
per week;  
Supervision by line 
coordinators and a group 
leader; 
Group leader responsi-
bility4: allocating skill-
specific tasks and seats 
to workers 
Several assembly 
lines in two shifts over 
5 days per week; 
Supervision by line 
coordinators 
Production workers 
allocated in five 
production lines; work 
in three shifts over 
five to seven days per 
week5 
Production divided 
into three operations 
areas, work organiza-
tion within divisions 
resembles other 
subsidiaries, working 
in 3-4 shifts over 7 
days/week 
Worker teams of 45-
70 persons supervised 
by instructors (re-
sponsible for rotation) 
and shift leaders 
(overlooking two-three 
production lines)  
 
                                                          
2  Managers try to maintain established teams of workers. 
3  Experience has shown that women are more suitable for the given working conditions. In 
contrast to other subsidiaries, the factory only has a few sitting jobs in production; and 
the majority of workers perform their job in a standing position.  
4  Other responsibilities of the group leaders include solving disciplinary issues before esca-
lating them to the HRM department, granting workers’ holiday request, or handling 
workers’ dissatisfaction. 
5  Seasonal workers work as one group per line. Permanent workers form smaller teams, or 
mini-companies. One production line consists of five mini-companies in which tasks are 
similar, i.e., the assembling team, adjustment team, or the quality checking team. The 
small management team is integrated with other employees.  
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 MBE MFR MPL MHU 
Workplace 
rotation and 
task fragmen-
tation 
Managers decide who 
rotates where and how 
often; 
Rotation highly encour-
aged to decrease 
repetitive tasks; 
Task fragmentation low; 
given the frequent 
change in produced 
models workers have 
developed multiple 
abilities  
Managers determine 
which tasks and 
under what conditions 
workers perform; 
Work tasks frag-
mented, but workers 
perform a variety of 
tasks and rotate 
frequently to de-
crease the monotony 
of work and overall 
task fragmentation 
Particular tasks 
fragmented, but 
workers encouraged 
to perform multiple 
tasks; overall task 
fragmentation is low;  
Rotation highly 
encouraged 
High task fragmenta-
tion6, low worker 
discretion, extensive 
managerial control 
over work organiza-
tion;  
Routine work more 
encouraged than 
frequent rotation (for 
the sake of productiv-
ity); 
Management encour-
ages multi-skilled 
permanent workers 
and organizes regular 
training sessions. 
Management-
worker inter-
action and 
worker discre-
tion 
Flat hierarchies, informal 
interaction; 
High discretion; manag-
ers seek feedback from 
workers with first-hand 
experience to suggest 
task improvements; 
Extensive worker in-
volvement in defining 
work content for mass 
production 
Interaction more 
formal than in other 
subsidiaries (following 
local standards in 
workplace communi-
cation); 
High discretion: 
workers participate in 
quality improvement 
teams and suggest 
improvement proce-
dures 
Flat hierarchies, 
informal interaction 
prevails (after initial 
agreement, in line 
with local standards);   
Low managerial 
control and high task 
discretion; upon 
informing the direct 
supervisor workers 
can freely rotate 
within their team 
Informal interaction at 
the workplace (follow-
ing local standards);  
Managers not strictly 
segmented from 
workers  
Type of 
reward 
Almost exclusively non-
financial reward (non-
financial performance 
appraisal) 
Both financial and 
non-financial rewards 
(non-financial per-
formance appraisal 
and financial per-
formance pay) 
Non-financial per-
formance appraisal 
closely related to 
individual financial 
rewards;  
Management fosters 
competition between 
workers to increase 
productivity 
Non-financial per-
formance appraisal 
closely related to 
individual financial 
rewards; 
Competition between 
teams and individuals 
is strongly encouraged 
Reward 
allocation 
principle 
Collective distribution of 
rewards 
Collective rewards 
supplemented by 
some individual 
performance-based 
rewards: workers with 
satisfactory perform-
ance have a higher 
chance for stable or 
regular employment 
Financial rewards 
(performance pay) 
distributed according 
to short-term and 
long-term personal 
performance, but also 
the performance of 
teams, production 
lines and the whole 
factory 
Financial rewards 
(performance pay) 
allocated according to 
individual and team 
performance 
Source: adopted from Kahancová (2010) 
                                                          
6  During a working day, workers are assigned to a particular seat and remain there for the 
whole shift and even longer – as long as the number and structure of groups do not 
change. 
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Table A.2: Performance rewards and performance pay in Multico subsidiaries 
Subsidiary 
Existing 
performance 
reward (non-
financial) 
Type of 
performance 
reward 
Performance 
pay  
(financial) 
Type of per-
formance pay 
Frequency of 
performance 
pay 
Trade union 
involvement 
MBE Yes; unrelated to wage 
Personal; group 
leaders No  N/a N/a 
Yes (negotiated 
agreement) 
MFR Yes; related to wage 
Personal; group 
leaders Yes 
Individual and 
collective (13th 
month’s wage, 
annual wage 
increase) 
Annual 
Only in collec-
tive wage 
increase 
MPL Yes; related to wage 
Personal; group 
leaders Yes 
Individual and 
collective (15% of 
wage: 9% 
individual, 6% 
team perform-
ance) 
Monthly 
Only in collec-
tive wage 
increase 
MHU Yes; related to wage 
Factory system 
with predefined 
points 
Yes 
Individual and 
collective (15% of 
wage: 10% 
output, 5% 
quality) 
Monthly 
Only in collec-
tive wage 
increase 
Source: adopted from Kahancová (2010) 
Table A.3: Fringe benefits in Multico subsidiaries 
Benefit description MBE MFR MPL MHU 
New Year’s day breakfast, lunch or drink 
    
Recognition of workers’ personal achievements (i.e. additional diploma or certificate 
in areas of personal interest)     
Santa Claus event (and gifts for workers and/or for their children)     
Women’s day event (flowers for female workers)     
Christmas presents, also for temporary workers     
Integration and team-building parties, sponsored team trips     
“Discovery day”, open day for visitors (workers’ families, potential recruits)     
Long-service recognition, i.e. upon retirement (MBE: TV sets,7 MFR: work medal, 
MHU: thank-you note, refreshments)     
Volunteer firemen recognition day     
Medical care services (MHU), extra-legal medical insurance (MFR)     
Sickness supplement, income supplement in the event of death     
Multico-sponsored insurance for non-work-related accidents     
Psychologist (2 days/week)     
Loans with 0% interest (MFR), housing loans (MHU)     
Personnel shop or discount vouchers for Multico products     
Soccer and cinema tickets (MBE), holiday checks (MHU)     
Frequent competitions and drawings to win Multico products      
Multico-sponsored summer outdoor social and cultural events for workers and their 
families      
Free parking for workers (in MBE, a union-stipulated walking bonus for parking in 
distant parking places)      
Contracted bus service for workers (MHU), agreement with public transport authority 
to adjust bus schedules to Multico’s shifts (MPL)     
                                                          
7  Rewarding retired workers with a TV set has been a tradition in MBE for many years. 
Given the growing costs of production of flat-screen TV sets and following an agreement 
with trade unions, this practice no longer exists.  
